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Introduc7on
Orthodox	 game	 theory	 idenAfies	 raAonal	 soluAons	 to	 interpersonal	 and	 strategically	 interdependent
decision	problems,	games,	using	the	noAon	of	individualisAc	best-response	reasoning.	When	each	player's
chosen	strategy	in	a	game	is	a	best	response	to	the	strategies	chosen	by	other	players,	they	are	said	to	be	in
a	 Nash	 equilibrium—a	 point	 at	which	 no	 player	 can	 benefit	 by	 unilaterally	 changing	 his	 or	 her	 strategy.
Consider	 the	 Hi-Lo	 and	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma	 two-player	 games	 illustrated	 in	 Figures	 1	 and	 2.	 The








game.	In	 the	 case	of	 the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game,	 there	 is	only	one	Nash	equilibrium,	 (D,	D),	 since,	 for
either	 player,	 the	 strategy	D	 is	 the	 best	 response	 to	whatever	 the	 other	 player	 is	 going	 to	 do.	 As	 such,
individualisAc	best-response	reasoning	resolves	 this	game	definiAvely.	However,	due	to	 the	 inefficiency	of
the	outcome	(D,	D)	compared	to	the	outcome	(C,	C)—both	players	are	beXer	off	in	the	laXer	than	they	are
in	the	former—for	some	the	outcome	(C,	C)	is	not	obviously	irraAonal	and	there	is	a	division	of	opinion	(at
least	 outside	 the	 circle	 of	 professional	 game	 theorists)	 about	what	 a	 raAonal	 player	 ought	 to	 do	 in	 this
game.

















to	 the	 theory	 of	 team	 reasoning,	 people	 may	 not	 always	 be	 employing	 individualisAc	 best-response









behind	 the	 output,	 but	 leaving	 open	how	 the	 computaAon	 is	 implemented	 and	how	 it	 is	 realised	 in	 the
brain	(Gold,	in	press). 
A	number	of	different	versions	of	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	have	been	proposed	and	developed.	These
differ	with	 respect	 to	what	 triggers	 decision-makers'	 adopAon	of	 the	 team	mode	of	 reasoning	 and	what









are	 represented	 by	 the	 payoff	 numbers	 they	 associate	 with	 the	 available	 outcomes,	 and	 the	 opAmal
strategy	is	that	which	gives	the	player	in	quesAon	the	highest	expected	payoff.	In	this	light,	the	best	strategy
for	 an	 individualisAcally	 reasoning	 player	 in	 the	 Hi-Lo	 game	 (see	 Figure	 1	 above)	 is	 condiAonal	 on	 that
player's	belief	about	what	the	other	player	is	going	to	do:	play	Hi	or	play	Lo.	In	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game
(see	Figure	2)	the	best	strategy	is	uncondiAonally	to	play	D.
Team	reasoning,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	based	on	the	quesAon	of	what	 is	opAmal	 for	 the	group	of	players
acAng	together	as	a	team.	A	team	reasoner	first	 idenAfies	an	outcome	of	a	game	that	best	promotes	the
interests	of	the	team	and	then	chooses	the	strategy	that	is	his	or	her	part	of	aXaining	that	outcome.	If	the









best,	 the	 outcome	 (Lo,	 Lo)	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 the	 second-best	 and	 the	 outcomes	 (Hi,	 Lo)	 and	 (Lo,	Hi)	 the















team	 reason.	 One	 answer,	 mainly	 associated	 with	 Bacharach	 (2006),	 is	 that	 the	 mode	 of	 reasoning	 an
individual	uses	 is	a	maXer	of	 that	decision-maker's	psychological	make-up,	which	 in	 turn	may	depend	on
certain	features	of	the	context	 in	which	decisions	are	made,	but	otherwise	 lies	outside	of	the	 individual's
conscious	 control.	 A	 second	 answer,	 proffered	 by	 Sugden	 (2003),	 is	 that	 an	 individual	 may	 choose	 to
endorse	 a	 parAcular	mode	 of	 reasoning	 based	 on	 consideraAons	 about	 the	 potenAal	 benefits	 of	 one	 or
another	possible	mode	of	reasoning	and	his	or	her	beliefs	about	the	modes	of	reasoning	endorsed	by	other
players,	 but	 this	 choice	 is	 outside	 of	 raAonal	 evaluaAon.	 A	 third	 possibility,	 proposed	 by	 Hurley	 (2005a,
2005b),	 is	 that	 individual	 decision-makers	 come	 to	 choose	 the	 team	 mode	 of	 reasoning	 as	 a	 result	 of
raAonal	deliberaAon	itself.
The	first	posiAon,	the	idea	that	the	adopAon	of	team	reasoning	is	outside	of	an	individual's	control,	can	be
found	 in	the	version	of	 the	theory	of	 team	reasoning	presented	by	Bacharach	(2006)	and	Smerilli	 (2012).
Here	the	mode	of	reasoning	that	an	individual	adopts	is	a	maXer	of	a	psychological	frame	through	which	he
or	 she	 sees	 a	 decision	 problem.	The	 idea	 is	 similar	 to	 that	of	 Tversky	and	Kahneman	 (1981,	p.453),	who
define	a	 frame	as,	 “the	decision-maker’s	 concepAon	of	 the	acts,	outcomes,	and	conAngencies	associated
with	a	parAcular	choice”.	In	Tversky	and	Kahneman's	Prospect	Theory,	framing	a	decision	in	terms	of	losses
or	gains	affects	the	part	of	the	value	funcAon	that	decision-makers	apply,

























than	 the	 outcome	 (Hi,	 Hi);	 in	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma,	 the	 outcome	 (D,	 D)	 is	 worse	 for	 both	 than	 the
outcome	(C,	C).	This	means	that	the	outcomes	(Lo,	Lo)	and	(D,	D)	are	not	Pareto	efficient.	(An	outcome	of	a
game	 is	 said	 to	 be	 Pareto	 efficient	 if	 there	 is	 no	 other	 outcome	 available	 that	would	make	 some	 player
beXer-off	without	 at	 the	 same	Ame	making	 any	 other	 player	worse-off.)	 According	 to	 Bacharach,	 strong
interdependence	increases	the	likelihood	that	an	individual	would	frame	a	decision-problem	as	a	problem
for	a	team.
The	 double-crossing	 feature	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 individual	 personally	 benefiAng	 from	 a	 unilateral
deviaAon	 from	 the	 team	 reasoning	 soluAon.	 It	 is	 the	 incenAve	 to	 act	 on	 individual	 reasoning	when	 one
believes	that	the	other	player	is	acAng	on	team	reasoning.	This	feature	is	present	in	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma
but	 not	 the	 Hi-Lo	 game.	 In	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma,	 each	 individual	 would	 personally	 benefit	 from	 a
unilateral	 deviaAon	 from	 the	 cooperaAve	 play	 of	 (C,	C).	 There	 is	 an	 incenAve	 to	 double-cross	 the	 other
player,	playing	D	if	the	other	player	is	expected	to	play	C.	According	to	Bacharach,	the	possibility	of	double
crossing	decreases	the	likelihood	of	a	parAcular	decision-maker	framing	a	decision	problem	as	a	problem	for
a	 team.	 Smerilli	 (2012)	 formalizes	 this	 intuiAon,	 providing	 a	 model	 where	 the	 double-crossing	 feature
causes	players	to	vacillate	between	frames.
Another	 possibility,	 suggested	 by	Bardsley	 (2000,	 Ch.	 5,	 SecAon	 6),	 is	 that	 payoff	differences	within	 cells
introduce	 an	 inter-individual	 aspect	 to	 game	 situaAons	 and	 Pareto	 superior	 outcomes	 a	 collecAve	 one,
which	respecAvely	inhibit	or	promote	team	reasoning.	Zizzo	and	Tan	(2007)	introduce	the	noAon	of	“game
harmony”,	a	generic	game	property	describing	how	conflictual	or	non-conflictual	the	players'	interests	are,
and	 suggest	 some	ways	of	measuring	 it,	 the	simplest	one	being	 just	 the	correlaAon	between	the	players'














possible	 gains	 from	coordinaAon	are	high	or	 the	 losses	 from	coordinaAon	 failure	 are	 great,	which	 leaves
open	how	consensual	players'	interests	are	in	general,	whereas	game	harmony	is	simply	a	measure	of	how
consensual	 players'	 interests	 are	 and	 does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 size	 of	 the	 potenAal	 gains	 from
cooperaAon.





players'	 recogniAon	 of	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 social	 group	 or	 a	 parAcular	 category,	 having	 common
interests,	 being	 subject	 to	 a	 common	 fate	 or	 simply	 having	 face-to-face	 contact.	 For	 Bacharach,	 group
idenAty	 is	 a	 “framing	phenomenon”	 (2006,	p.	 81).	 To	group	 idenAfy	 is	 to	 conceive	of	oneself	 as	 a	 group
member:	to	represent	oneself	as	a	group	member	and	have	group	concepts	in	one's	frame.	Hence,	for	him,
all	 these	factors	that	trigger	group	 idenAty	may	cause	a	shio	from	the	“I	 frame”	to	a	“we	frame”	(see,	 in
parAcular,	Bacharach,	2006,	pp.	76-81).
Sugden	 (2003,	2011,	2015)	 takes	 the	 second	posiAon	described	above:	an	 individual	decision-maker	may
choose	to	endorse	team	reasoning,	but	there	is	no	basis	for	raAonal	evaluaAon	of	this	choice.	For	Sugden,
there	may	be	numerous	modes	of	valid	reasoning	and	an	individual	decision-maker	may	choose	to	endorse
any	 one	 of	 them,	 but	 none	 of	 these	 modes	 of	 reasoning	 are	 privileged	 over	 others	 on	 the	 basis	 of
instrumental	raAonality.	Instrumental	pracAcal	reasoning	allows	an	agent	to	infer	the	best	means	to	achieve
its	goals.	Therefore	instrumental	raAonality	must	presume	both	the	unit	of	decision-making	agency	as	well
as	 its	 goals	 and	neither	of	 these	are	 amenable	 to	evaluaAon	by	 the	 theory	of	 raAonality	 itself.	However,
Sugden	discusses	a	number	of	condiAons	that	may	need	to	be	saAsfied	in	order	for	an	individual	to	endorse

















reason	 (Sugden,	 2000,	 pp .	182-183).	 The	difference	 is	 that,	 in	 Sugden's	 theory,	 people	make	 a	 choice	 to
team	reason	and	assurance	plays	a	part	 in	 this,	whereas	 for	Bacharach,	 team	reasoning	 is	 the	result	of	a
psychological	process	and	may	lead	team	reasoners	to	be	worse	off	than	they	would	have	been	if	they	had
reasoned	as	 individuals	 (for	 instance	 they	may	 cooperate	 in	 a	Prisoner's	Dilemma	when	 the	other	player
defects;	for	more	on	how	this	can	happen	see	Gold,	2012).
Bacharach	and	Sugden	agree	 that	all	 goals	are	 the	goals	of	agents	and	 that	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	evaluate











goals	 but,	 once	 we	 recognise	 that	 there	 are	 other	 possible	 units	 of	 agency	 (and	 evaluaAon),	 we	might
quesAon	why	 it	 is	 the	 case	 that	 the	 personal	 level	 takes	 priority.	For	 a	 decision-maker	 in	Regan's	 (1980)
theory	of	cooperaAve	uAlitarianism,	for	example,	the	goal	is	always	uAlitarian	and	the	quesAon	is	what	unit
of	 agency	one	 should	be	adopAng	given	 this	 goal.	However,	 taking	goals	 as	 given	 to	us	by	our	 theory	of
value,	or	moral	theory,	turns	team	reasoning	from	a	theory	of	raAonal	choice	into	a	theory	of	moral	choice,
which	is	not	intended	by	many	of	its	proponents.
The	 problem	 is	 brought	 out	 in	 recent	 work	 by	 Gauthier	 (2013).	 Gauthier	 has	 long	 held	 that	 it	 can	 be
instrumentally	 raAonal	 to	 cooperate	 in	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma	 game	 (Gauthier,	 1986).	 In	 a	 recent	 re-
working	 of	 his	 theory,	 Gauthier	 (2013)	 contrasts	 two	 opposed	 concepAons	 of	 deliberaAve	 raAonality:
maximizaAon	 (equivalent	 to	 individualisAc	best-response	 reasoning)	and	Pareto-opAmizaAon.	He	suggests
that	Pareto-opAmizaAon	is	a	necessary	condiAon	for	raAonality	in	mulA-player	games.	A	Pareto-opAmizing
theory	 “provides	 only	 a	 single	 set	 of	 direcAves	 to	 all	 the	 interacAng	 agents,	 with	 the	 direcAve	 to	 each
premised	on	the	acceptance	by	the	others	of	the	direcAves	to	them”	(Gauthier	2013,	p.	607).	The	outcome
selected	must	be	both	efficient	and	fair	in	how	it	distributes	the	expected	gains	of	cooperaAon.	Although	he
does	not	explicitly	use	 the	 term	“team	 reasoning”,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	Gauthier's	 theory	 is	 similar	 to	 ideas	of
team	reasoning	for	mutual	gain.	His	jusAficaAon	for	team	reasoning	is	that	it	would	pass	a	contractarian	test










As	Gauthier	(2013,	p.	624)	puts	 it,	his	goal	 is	to	show	that	“social	morality	 is	part	of	raAonal	choice,	or	at
least,	 integral	 to	 raAonal	 cooperaAon”.	However,	 whilst	 he	 has	 sketched	 out	 what	 Pareto-opAmizaAon
would	involve,	Gauthier	has	not	provided	any	argument	for	its	raAonality;	he	concludes	that	he	has	not	yet
been	successful	in	bridging	the	two	and	that	more	needs	to	be	done	regarding	the	connecAon	to	raAonality
(in	other	words,	how	 instrumental	 raAonality	may	require	us	 to	cooperate	 in	social	 interacAons).	But	 it	 is
hard	 to	 see	 how	Gauthier	 could	 bring	 Pareto-opAmizaAon	within	 instrumental	 raAonality.	 If	 he	 goes	 the
same	route	as	Hurley	and	privileges	the	individual's	perspecAve	and	goals,	then	he	needs	to	explain	why	it
is	 instrumentally	raAonal	 to	cooperate	when	the	 individual	could	do	beXer	by	deviaAng	 in	situaAons	that
have	the	double	crossing	feature.	Or,	if	the	idea	is	that	there	is	some	addiAon	to	instrumental	raAonality	for
choosing	the	level	of	agency,	then	it	is	hard	to	see	how	to	characterize	such	a	process.	A	reasoning	process
already	 seems	 to	presume	an	agent	who	 is	 doing	 the	 reasoning.	As	Bardsley	 (2001,	p.	 185)	puts	 it,	 “the
quesAon	 `should	 I	 ask	myself	 “what	 am	 I	 to	 do?”	 or	 “what	 are	we	 to	 do?”?'	 presupposes	 a	 first	 person
singular	point	of	view”.
3.	What	Do	Teams	Strive	For?
We	 now	 turn	 to	 reviewing	different	 proposals	 about	 a	 team's	 goals.	 The	 approaches	 presented	 differ	 in
whether	 they	 require	 individual	 decision-makers	 to	 someAmes	 sacrifice	 their	 personal	 interests	 for	 the
benefit	of	other	members	of	 a	 team	and	whether	 they	 rely	on	making	 interpersonal	 comparisons	of	 the
interacAng	players'	payoffs.	Bacharach	(2006)	menAons	Pareto	efficiency	as	a	minimal	condiAon,	i.e.,	that	if












from	 any	 other	 outcome.)	 This	 funcAon,	 however,	 someAmes	 fails	with	 respect	 to	 the	 noAon	 of	mutual
advantage.	 Consider	 a	 slight	 variaAon	 of	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma	 game	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 4.	 Here	 the






which	suggests,	 for	example,	 that	 the	 row	player	prefers	 the	outcome	(D,	C)	 to	 (C,	C)	 to	a	greater	extent
than	the	column	player	prefers	the	outcome	(C,	D)	to	(D,	D)	in	Figure	4.	Strictly	speaking,	such	comparisons
go	beyond	the	orthodox	assumpAons	of	expected	uAlity	theory,	which	make	numerical	representaAons	of









Although	 he	 does	 not	 present	 an	 explicit	 funcAon	 of	 a	 team's	 goals,	 in	 a	 recent	 paper	 Sugden	 (2015)
proposes	 to	measure	mutual	 advantage	 relaAve	 to	 a	 parAcular	 threshold.	 The	 threshold	 is	 each	 player's
personal	maximin	 payoff	 level	 in	 a	 game—the	 payoff	 that	 he	 or	 she	 can	 guarantee	 him	 or	 herself
independently	of	 the	other	players'	chosen	strategies.	 In	 the	Hi-Lo	game	this	 is	0	 for	both	players.	 In	 the
Prisoner's	Dilemma	game	of	Figures	2	and	4,	this	is	1,	since	it	is	the	lowest	possible	payoff	that	either	player
can	 aXain	 by	 playing	D.	 A	 strategy	 profile	 is	 said	 to	 be	mutually	 beneficial	 if	 (a)	 it	 results	 in	 each	player
receiving	 a	 payoff	 that	 is	 greater	 than	 his	 or	 her	maximin	 payoff	 level	 in	 a	 game,	 and	 (b)	 each	 player's
parAcipaAon	in	team	play	is	necessary	for	the	aXainment	of	those	payoffs.7
Karpus	 and	 Radzvilas	 (2016)	 propose	 a	 formal	 funcAon	 of	 a	 team's	 goals	 that	 is	 based	 on	 the	 noAon	 of
mutual	 advantage	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 above	whilst	 also	 incorporaAng	 the	 Pareto	 efficiency	 criterion	 (in	 a
weak	 sense	 of	 Pareto	 efficiency,	 which	 means	 that	 an	 outcome	 of	 a	 game	 is	 efficient	 if	 there	 is	 no
alternaAve	that	 is	strictly	preferred	to	 it	by	every	player	 in	the	game).	 It	suggests	that	an	outcome	that	 is























(the	 addiAonal	 unit	 of	 individual	 benefit	 to	 Player	 1	 is	 not	mutual).8	 As	 such,	 the	 funcAon	 idenAfies	 the




There	 is	a	major	difficulty	that	any	empirical	 test	of	 team	reasoning	will	unavoidably	 face:	 the	fact	 that	a
number	 of	 separate	 hypotheses	 are	 being	 tested	 at	 once.	 The	main	 hypothesis	 to	 be	 tested	 is	 whether
people	 reason	 as	 members	 of	 a	 team	 in	 a	 parAcular	 situaAon.	 This,	 however,	 is	 intertwined	 with	 two
addiAonal	auxiliary	hypotheses.	The	first	is	whether	the	parAcular	situaAon	at	hand	is	one	in	which	people
might	reason	as	members	of	a	team	in	general,	and	the	second	is	whether	the	experimenter	has	correctly
specified	 the	goals	 that	 the	members	of	 the	 team	 try	 to	achieve.	 These	may	 involve	assuming	parAcular
answers	 to	 the	“when	do	people	reason	as	members	of	a	team?”	and	the	“what	do	people	do	when	they
reason	as	members	of	a	team?”	quesAons	that	we	idenAfied	above.	Also,	if	decision-makers	do	not	follow
individualisAc	 best-response	 reasoning	 in	 certain	 situaAons,	 we	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	 disAnguish	 team
reasoning	 from	 other	 possible	 modes	 of	 reasoning	 that	 they	 may	 choose	 to	 endorse,	 e.g.,	 regret
minimizaAon	or	ambiguity	aversion,	or	from	factors	that	influence	decisions,	like	risk	aversion.	
Despite	 these	 difficulAes,	 a	 number	 of	 relaAvely	 recent	 empirical	 studies	 have	 been	 carried	 out	 in	 an
aXempt	to	 test	 the	theory	of	 team	reasoning.	Since	the	aim	 is	 to	 test	 the	theory	of	 team	reasoning	tout
court,	the	experiments	use	situaAons	where	it	is	naturally	invoked	as	an	explanaAon	of	actual	play. They	can
be	 broadly	 divided	 into	 two	 groups:	 those	 that	 focus	 on	 team	 reasoning	 where	 it	 resolves	 a	 Nash
equilibrium	 selecAon	problem	 (coordinaAon	problems)	 and	 those	 that	 focus	on	 team	 reasoning	where	 it
selects	outcomes	that	are	not	Nash	equilibria	(as	in	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma).	We	will	review	both	types	of
















The	 first	 category	 of	 experiments	 involves	 games	 with	 mulAple	 Nash	 equilibria	 where	 non-equilibrium
outcomes	yield	no	payoffs	to	the	interacAng	players.	As	such,	they	are	Nash	equilibrium	coordinaAon	games
in	which	players	try	to	coordinate	their	acAons	on	one	of	the	available	equilibria	in	order	to	aXain	posiAve
payoffs.	 Team	 reasoning	 is	 said	 to	 single	 out	 one	of	 the	 equilibria	 as	 uniquely	 opAmal	 for	 a	 team	and	 is
tested	against	other	possible	modes	of	reasoning	that	may	be	at	play.	The	dominant	alternaAve	explanaAon
of	 behaviour	 in	 these	 experiments	 (to	 that	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 team	 reasoning)	 is	assumed	 to	 be	 cogniAve
hierarchy	 theory,	which	posits	 the	existence	of	 individualisAc	best-response	 reasoners	who	differ	 in	 their





on	 for	 higher	 level	 cogniAve	 types.	 Although	 in	 principle	 the	 cogniAve	 hierarchy	 theory	 allows	 for	 any
number	 of	 cogniAve	 types	 (where	 each	 type	 assumes	 other	 players	 to	 be	 of	 one	 level	 lesser	 type	 than
themselves),	in	pracAce	it	is	usually	assumed	that	most	decision-makers	are	level-1	or	level-2	reasoners.
Bardsley	et	 al.	 (2010)	 conducted	a	 similar	experiment	at	 two	 separate	 locaAons—one	 in	Amsterdam	and
one	 in	Noqngham—using	 a	 set	 of	Nash	equilibrium	coordinaAon	games	described	above.	An	example	 is
given	 in	Figure	5.	 In	 this	game,	the	best	response	to	a	player	who	chooses	any	of	 the	opAons	with	equal















A B C D
A 10,	10 0,	0 0,	0 0,	0
B 0,	0 10,	10 0,	0 0,	0
C 0,	0 0,	0 10,	10 0,	0





outcomes	 other	 than	 in	 terms	 of	 payoffs	 that	 the	 players	 would	 aXain	 if	 they	managed	 to	 successfully
coordinate	their	choices.	For	example,	the	outcome	(A,	A)	could	not	be	idenAfied	as	being	unique	due	to	its





outcome	 (D,	D),	 a	 player	 is	 “choosing”	 the	 corresponding	 strategy	D	 because	 of	 the	 uniqueness	 of	 that
outcome.	If	both	players	pick	one	of	the	three	indisAnguishable	outcomes,	there	is	a	⅓	chance	that	they	will
pick	the	same	one,	whereas	if	they	both	choose	strategy	D,	they	can	be	sure	of	aXaining	the	outcome	(D,
D).	So	the	expected	payoff	from	trying	to	coordinate	on	one	of	the	outcomes	(A,	A),	 (B,	B)	or	 (C,	C)	 for	a
team-reasoning	decision-maker	is	3⅓	while	the	certain	payoff	from	coordinaAng	on	the	outcome	(D,	D)	is	9.
(See	Gold	and	Sugden's	 introducAon	to	Bacharach	(2006)	for	more	on	this	 idea.)	To	put	this	differently,	 it
may	 be	 said	 that	ex	 ante,	 before	 the	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 other	 player's	 acAon	 is	 resolved	 and	 when
players	take	into	account	the	likelihood	of	coordinaAng	their	acAons	in	the	computaAon	of	their	expected
payoffs,	 the	 opAmal	 outcome	 in	 terms	 of	 Pareto	 efficiency	 is	 (D,	D).	 Ex	 post,	 once	 the	 game	 has	 been
played,	the	three	outcomes	(A,	A),	(B,	B)	and	(C,	C)	Pareto	dominate	(D,	D).11
The	 experimental	 results,	 though	 showing	 a	 clear	 deviaAon	 from	 individualisAc	 best-response	 reasoning
(assuming	 that	 it	 would	 not	 discriminate	 among	 the	 available	 Nash	 equilibria),	 are	 different	 in	 the
Amsterdam	and	the	Noqngham	experiments.	The	results	from	Amsterdam	seem	to	suggest	the	presence	of
team	 reasoning	 rather	 than	 cogniAve	 hierarchy	 reasoning,	whereas	 the	 results	 from	Noqngham	 tend	 to
suggest	 the	 opposite.	 In	 addiAon	 to	 making	 choices	 in	 numerical	 coordinaAon	 games,	 such	 as	 the	 one
illustrated	above,	both	experiments	asked	 the	parAcipants	 to	complete	other	non-numerical	 “text”	 tasks.
These	differed	between	the	two	experiments	and	the	authors	speculate	that	there	may	have	been	spillover
effects	 from	 the	 text	 tasks	 on	 the	 modes	 of	 reasoning	 used	in	 the	 numerical	 coordinaAon	 tasks.	 In
Amsterdam,	text	tasks	involved	picking	the	odd	one	out,	so	parAcipants	may	have	tended	to	pick	strategies
that	were	associated	with	outcomes	appearing	as	odd	ones	out	in	the	number	tasks,	while	in	Noqngham





















the	 two	 players,	 such	 as	 the	 pair	 of	 outcomes	 (R1,	R1)	 and	 (R2,	R2)	 in	 the	 above	 example.	 In	 fact,	 the
outcomes	(R1,	R1)	and	(R2,	R2)	were	 indisAnguishable	 in	all	games	 in	the	two	experiments	and	the	team
opAmal	choice	was	always	associated	with	the	aXainment	of	the	outcome	(R3,	R3).	(The	 labels	R1,	R2	and


















R1 9,	10 0,	0 0,	0
R2 0,	0 10,	9 0,	0





the other gets 9
You get 9,
the other gets 9
You get 9,
the other gets 10
You get 9,
the other gets 10
You get 9,
the other gets 9
You get 10,
the other gets 9
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the	other	two	and	this	is	not	compensated	by	greater	equality	(games	G3,	G5,	and	G7)	as	well	as	when	the






people	 may	 not	 achieve	 the	 level	 of	 reasoning	 “sophisAcaAon”	 that	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 idenAfy	 the
opAmality	of	the	ex	ante	Pareto	efficiency.	“Naive”	team	reasoners	may	want	to	pursue	the	group	interest





G6,	which	 has	 perfect	 alignment	 of	 payoffs,	G5	 also	 has	 perfect	 alignment	 of	 payoffs	 but	 relaAvely	 liXle
team	 reasoning.	 In	 contrast,	 G4	 and	 G9	 have	 lower	 levels	 of	 payoff	 alignment	 but	 high	 levels	 of	 team




outcomes	 from	 the	 perspecAve	 of	 the	 team	 by	 idenAfying	 those	 outcomes	 that	maximize	 the	 extent	 of
mutual	advantage	as	suggested	by	Karpus	and	Radzvilas	(2016).	These	outcomes	are	always	efficient	in	the
weak	sense	of	Pareto	efficiency.	(Recall	that	an	outcome	of	a	game	is	said	to	be	Pareto	efficient	in	the	weak




(R1,	R1) (R2,	R2) (R3,	R3) R1 R2 R3
G1 (9,	10) (10,	9) (9,	9) CH	14%	TR CH	11%	TR CH	74%	TR
G2 (9,	10) (10,	9) (11,	11) CH	0%	TR CH	1%	TR CH	99%	TR
G3 (9,	10) (10,	9) (9,	8) CH	51%	TR CH	45%	TR CH	4%	TR
G4 (9,	10) (10,	9) (11,	10) CH	16%	TR CH	4%	TR CH	80%	TR
G5 (10,	10) (10,	10) (9,	9) CH	48%	TR CH	34%	TR CH	18%	TR
G6 (10,	10) (10,	10) (11,	11) CH	1%	TR CH	3%	TR CH	96%	TR
G7 (10,	10) (10,	10) (9,	8) CH	51%	TR CH	31%	TR CH	18%	TR
G8 (10,	10) (10,	10) (11,	10) CH	26%	TR CH	22%	TR CH	52%	TR
G9 (9,	12) (12,	9) (10,	11) CH	16%	TR CH	11%	TR CH	73%	TR
G10 (10,	10) (10,	10) (11,	9) CH	43%	TR CH	27%	TR CH	30%	TR






using	 unique	 features	 of	 some	 outcome	 (if	 an	 outcome	 with	 unique	 features	 exists)	 as	 a	 possible
coordinaAng	device.	This	approach	could	explain	choices	observed	in	games	G3,	G5	and	G7	in	addiAon	to





the	 set	 of	 team-opAmal	 outcomes,	 since	 they	 all	 provide	 the	 same	 extent	 of	mutual	 benefit	 to	 the	 two
players.	 The	 outcome	 (R3,	 R3),	 however,	 is	 unique	 in	 this	 set	 and	 team-reasoning	 decision-makers,
therefore,	opt	for	this	outcome.
6.	Tests	Involving	Non-Nash	Equilibrium	Play
We	 now	 turn	 to	 tests	 of	 team	 reasoning	 where	 a	 team	 selects	 outcomes	 that	 are	 not	 Nash	 equilibria.
Although	 any	 empirical	 study	 of	 games	 in	which	 team	 reasoning	 prescribes	 non-equilibrium	play	 can	 be
seen	as	a	test	of	the	theory	(e.g.,	any	test	 involving	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game)	reviewing	all	historical




to	 each	 player	 and	 the	 payoffs	 to	 the	 two	 players	 were	 symmetric).	 All	 games	 had	 a	 unique	 Nash
equilibrium	and	a	unique	non-equilibrium	outcome	that	was	opAmal	from	the	perspecAve	of	a	team.	The
study	 assumed	 team	 play	 to	 be	 the	 maximizaAon	 of	 the	 average	 of	 players'	 payoffs.	 The	 predicted
outcomes,	however,	would	be	the	same	using	any	of	the	accounts	of	a	team's	goals	discussed	in	SecAon	3





was	 superior	 to	 the	Nash	 equilibrium	 in	 terms	 of	 Pareto	 efficiency	 (which	makes	 these	 cases	 somewhat






C 8,	8 5,	9 5,	5
D 9,	5 7,	7 5,	9










corresponding	 outcomes	 are	 indicated	 in	 bold	 in	 Figures	 9	 and	 10).	 Sugden's	 (2015)	 noAon	 of	 mutual
benefit	 (see	SecAon	3	above)	and	 the	 funcAon	of	 team's	 goals	discussed	by	Karpus	and	Radzvilas	 (2016)
would	yield	different	predicAons	in	some	of	these	games	(for	example,	in	Figure	9	the	opAmal	outcome	for
the	team	based	on	the	noAon	of	maximal	mutual	advantage	would	be	the	outcome	(A,	A)).	The	results	of
the	experiment	are	mixed,	with	at	 least	 two	out	of	 three	or	 three	out	of	 four	available	 strategies	played





50%	 team-reasoners,	 40%	 level-1	 and	 10%	 level-0	 types).	 There	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 increasing	 the
difficulty	of	a	 task	 increases	 the	amount	of	 randomizing	 (Bardsley	and	Ule,	2014).16	Since	 the	games	 that
Colman	et	al.	(2014)	used	had	numerous	strategies	and	non-symmetric	variable	payoffs,	and	appear	to	be
quite	complex	and	cogniAvely	demanding	in	the	idenAficaAon	of	raAonal	outcomes,	random	picking	and	the














A 3,	3 1,	1 0,	2
B 1,	1 1,	4 3,	0
C 0,	0 2,	1 2,	5
Figure	9:	An	example	of	a	3x3	game	from
Colman	et	al.	(2014)
A B C D
A 4,	4 2,	0 3,	2 1,	5
B 2,	2 3,	3 2,	2 2,	0
C 4,	3 2,	4 2,	5 3,	2





different	 direcAons.	 From	 the	 theoreAcal	 point	 of	 view,	 different	 answers	 were	 proposed	 to	 the	 two
fundamental	quesAons	 that	 the	 theory	of	 team	 reasoning	needs	 to	address:	 “when	do	people	 reason	as
members	of	a	team?”	and	“what	is	it	that	they	do	when	they	reason	in	this	way?”.	In	response	to	the	first
quesAon,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	mode	of	reasoning	that	an	individual	decision-maker	adopts	may
depend	 on	 that	 decision-maker's	 psychological	 make-up,	 it	 may	 be	 endorsed	 by	 the	 decision-maker
depending	 on	 a	 number	 of	 condiAons	 that	 need	 to	 be	 saAsfied,	 such	 as	 the	 assurance	 of	 others'
parAcipaAon	 in	team	play	and	the	noAon	of	mutual	benefit,	or	 it	may	be	a	result	of	raAonal	deliberaAon




in	 the	 second	 part	 of	 this	 chapter,	 are,	 at	 best,	mixed	 and	 further	 research	 in	 this	 field	 is	 needed.	 The
studies	start	from	the	assumpAon	that	the	games	they	use	are	situaAons	where	people	could	be	expected
to	 team	 reason.	 Nevertheless,	 some	 of	 them	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 providing	 indicaAve	 answers	 to	 the	 first
quesAon,	“when	do	people	reason	as	members	of	a	team?”,	because	they	arguably	idenAfy	circumstances
in	which	people	are	 likely	 to	 team	reason.	One	 interpretaAon	of	Faillo	et	al.	 (2013)	 is	 that	ex	post	Pareto
dominance	and	equality	play	an	important	role	in	group	idenAficaAon.	One	interpretaAon	of	Colman	et	al.
(2014)	 is	 that	 the	 team	 reasoning	 outcome	 needs	 to	 be	 simple	 and	 clear,	 as	 complex	 or	 cogniAvely















methods	 that	 go	 beyond	 mere	 observaAon	 of	 decision-makers'	 choices	 in	 games,	 e.g.,	 asking	 the
parAcipants	 to	 explain	 the	 reasons	behind	 their	 choices,	 or	 encouraging	 the	 adopAon	of	 one	or	 another
mode	of	 reasoning	 through	 the	use	of	 addiAonal	 pre-play	 tasks.	One	possibility	 for	 further	 experimental
work	 is	 to	 study	 how	 priming	 group	 or	 individualisAc	 thinking	 affects	 people's	 choices	 in	 simple	 Nash
equilibrium	coordinaAon	games	where	the	team-opAmal	outcome	seems	to	be	obvious.	Such	a	test	would
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